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mid-1960s to the mid-I970s? Why have there been periodic drops in saving 
rates, and what has determined the rates of investment? These questions are 
important because each of the three debt crises was precipitated by a large 
drop in domestic savings relative to investment and because most of Korea’s 
external debt has been used to finance the savingshvestment gap. 
A third puzzle is why Korea was able to combine a real depreciation with 
improved competitiveness and an increase in real wages. Policymakers 
elsewhere often resist devaluation precisely because they expect it to reduce 
real wages and the standard of living. We shall argue that one of the most 
interesting and important aspects of Korean development has been the 
interrelationship between exchange rates, wages, and labor productivity. 
In addition to these three puzzles about macroeconomic performance, our 
study will consider the distribution of income to Korea. And finally, we will 
look at the role of domestic policy. How did exchange rate, trade, and 
industrial policies influence growth and external balance? How did monetary 
and fiscal policies contribute to economic performance and to the 
accumulation of external debt? One view is that “Korea’s experience 
following the second wave of oil price increases is an excellent example of 
how orthodox stabilization policies, effectively implemented, can help a 
country adjust to external shocks” (Aghevli and Marquez-Ruarte 1985, 1). 
An alternative view is that “domestic stabilization measures were at best a 
way of muddling through, and contributed little to improving the current 
account during 1982-83 (Y. C. Park 1985c, 308). 
Part 2 is composed of six remaining chapters. In chapter 7 we examine the 
sources of growth. Chapter 8 is an analysis of the rapid rise in Korean 
savings and looks at the role of investment and the series of five-year plans. 
In chapter 9 we discuss exchange rate, trade, and industrial policies. The 
important link between wages, productivity, and international competitive- 
ness are explored in chapter 10. In chapter 11 we examine monetary and 
fiscal policies, and then discuss income distribution in chapter 12. In part 3 
(ch. 13) we will provide a synthesis and discuss the lessons from Korea’s 
experience. 
7 Korea’s Rapid Growth 
One of the most notable features of Korea’s experience has been its 
consistently high rates of growth. Growth rates for Korea and a number of 
other countries are given in table 7.1. The sample includes developed as well 
as developing countries, Asian as well as Latin American countries, and 
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Table 7.1 Economic Growth Rates (GDP) 
Country 1963-72 1972-81 1981-84 
Korea 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Turkey 
Singapore 
Hang Kong 
Japan 
U.S.  
France 
Germany 
U.K. 
9.84 
3.90 
8.51 
7 90 
4.88 
4.70 
6.30 
9 84 
- 
9.95 
3.93 
5.41 
4.40 
2.71 
7.89 
1.24 
6.51 
6.59 
7.63 
6.09 
4.89 
8.05 
8.68, 
4.30 
2.70 
2.68 
2.27 
I .39 
7.36 
0.38 
0.71 
-0.85 
3.17 
-0.75 
3.88 
7.20 
5.69 
3.73 
2.31 
1.13 
0.89 
1.39 
Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics. for all countries except Hang Kong. Data for Hang Kong is 
from the Korean Economic Planning Board. 
"1973-81 
debtor as well as nondebtor countries. Three facts stand out from these 
figures. First, all countries exhibit some slowdown in growth between 
1972-81 and 1981-84. Second, Asian countries (with the exception of the 
Philippines) have maintained relatively high growth rates. The Asian 
developing countries have grown more quickly on average than developing 
countries in Latin America, while Japan has maintained rapid growth relative 
to other OECD countries. Finally, even though Japan and a number of 
developing countries grew rapidly during the 1960s, only Singapore and 
Korea maintained growth rates in excess of 7 percent through 1984. 
How Korea achieved its rapid growth is one of the keys to understanding 
Korean adjustment. The rapid growth, particularly of exports, has enabled 
Korea to continue to service its large debt with less disruption than has 
occurred elsewhere. Large increases in labor productivity have contributed to 
the country's ability to depreciate while raising real wages. In addition, one 
of the most striking aspects of Korea's recovery from the 1979-80 crisis has 
been the ability to improve the trade balance, not from a recession-induced 
cut in imports, but with growth. 
In this chapter we examine Korea's growth rates in more detail. We begin 
with an analysis of the role of external debt in contributing to growth through 
financing investment. We then turn to decomposition of the sources of 
growth by sectoral origin and by type of expenditure. In the next section we 
discuss the results from an accounting decomposition of the role of factor 
inputs and productivity gains. The recent current account improvement with 
growth is discussed in a final section. 
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7.1 Growth Effects of External Debt 
We begin with a simple exercise to estimate the role of foreign borrowing 
in Korean growth. Our decomposition has two steps. In the first, the growth 
of GNP is equal to the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) multiplied by 
the increase in the capital stock (investment). The ICOR gives the additional 
capital required to generate an additional unit of output. It changes over time 
as the stock of capital and other inputs changes and as a result of positive or 
negative shocks to the output supply function. For example, technological 
improvements would tend to lower the ICOR, while a jump in oil prices 
would tend to raise it. In the second step, total investment is financed by a 
combination of domestic and foreign savings. With no external borrowing, 
investment would be constrained by domestic savings resulting in a smaller 
output expansion. 
Thus, it is possible to use the ICOR, investment rates, and the share of 
investment which was financed from abroad to decompose GNP growth into 
two parts-growth exclusive of foreign borrowing and growth attributable to 
external debt. The major shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes that 
the ICOR would have been the same if there had been no external borrowing 
and if investment had been smaller. For this reason, the results should be 
interpreted as indicative only. 
Table 7.2 provides the relevant data for five periods between 1962 and 
1982. It shows that the ratio of investment and domestic savings to GNP 
both rose steadily until 1982. Foreign savings increased during 1962-71 and 
has since fallen relative to GNP and to national savings. 
The ICOR has risen continually since 1962, with a large jump in 1982. 
(Using the 1982 figure one is likely to overestimate the appropriate figure for 
1983-85.) The marginal product of capital would be expected to fall as the 
capital stock increased. However, this tendency would be dampened by 
increases in other inputs (in particular, employment and human capital) and 
Table 7.2 Growth Effect of External Debt 
1962 - 66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1982 1962-82 
GNP growth rate, % (A) 
Investment ratio 
National saving ratio 
Fbreign saving ratio 
Marginal total capital 
coefficient' 
GNP growth rate without 
foreign savings, % (B)  
Growth effect of external 
debt, % (A - B) 
7.9 
16.3 
8.0 
8.6 
2.3 
3.8 
4.1 
9.7 10.2 
25.4 29.0 
15.1 20.4 
10.0 6.7 
3.1 3.4 
4.9 6.9 
4.8 2.3 
5.7 
31.0 
25.5 
5.6 
4.8 
4.1 
1.5 
5.3 8.2 
27.0 
22.4 
4.5 
6.2 3.4 
4.1 4.9 
1.2 3.3 
Note: GNP calculated at 1975 constant prices. 
"Total capital includes domestic gross fixed formation, increases in inventories, and statistical discrepancy. 
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by positive shifts (improved know-how, economies of scale). The data imply 
that the combination of increased capital and unfavorable developments (oil 
shocks and perhaps resource misallocations) have had the larger impact. 
The last rows of the table decompose GNP growth into a domestic and an 
external part. Approximately half of the growth during 1962-71 is 
attributable to external borrowing. If investment had been financed only by 
domestic savings, GNP would have grown by 3.8 percent in 1962-66 and 
4.9 percent in 1967-71. In comparison, the actual growth rates were 7.9 and 
9.7 percent, respectively. 
The contribution of debt to growth declined somewhat in 1972-76 and 
declined significantly during 1977-82. Without borrowing, growth would 
have been 6.9 percent (compared to the actual 10.2 percent) during 1972-76 
and 4.1 percent (compared to 5.5 percent) during 1977-82. 
Foreign-financed investment has clearly played an important part in 
Korea’s remarkable growth performance. Overall, about 3.3 percent a year, 
or 40 percent of total actual growth, is attributable to external borrowing. 
The importance of borrowing diminished over time, but still accounted for 
over 20 percent of growth during 1977-81. 
7.2 Decompositions of Growth 
In this section we consider some simple growth accounting. Contributions 
to growth by industrial sector are examined in table 7.3, and in table 7.4 we 
decompose GNP growth by type of expenditure. In each case, the 
contribution of an individual component to total GNP growth is computed as 
that component’s growth rate multiplied by its share in total output. The 
growth rates are given for five time periods, beginning with the 1971-73 
recovery from the first period of rapid debt accumulation and including the 
second and third debt accumulation periods and the subsequent recoveries. 
The tables show the high growth rates of GNP during the early 1970s, the 
slowdown following the first oil shock, the strong rebound during 1976-78, 
Table 7.3 Contributions to Growth by Sectoral Origin (in percentages) 
1971-73 1974-75 1976-78 1979-82 1983-85 
GNP 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Electricity, gas, and water 
Transportation 
Other 
9.46 
1.15 
0.10 
3.44 
0.39 
0.17 
0.78 
3.42 
7.65 
1.42 
0.18 
2.94 
0.72 
0.19 
0.49 
I .71 
11.71 
0.33 
0.11 
4.98 
1.08 
0.30 
1.10 
3.40 
3.57 
0.42 
0.01 
I .57 
0.33 
0.18 
0.58 
0.48 
8.58 
0.62 
0.12 
3.17 
0.88 
0.59 
0.66 
2.53 
Source: EPB. Mujor Stufisfics of Korean Economy, 1987 
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lsble 7.4 Contributions to Growth by Expenditure 
1971-73 1974-75 1976-78 1979-82 1983-85 
GNP 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Fixed investment 
Exports 
Imports 
OtheP 
9.46 7.65 11.74 3.57 8.58 
5.83 6.76 4.24 2.64 3.88 
0.60 1.57 0.88 0.38 0.42 
1.87 2.47 6.89 0.44 3.43 
5.39 1.89 6.77 2.59 3.54 
-4.54 -2.87 -7.97 - 1.31 -2.61 
0.30 -2.11 1.37 -1.15 -0.08 
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1987. 
Includes inventories, net factor payments from abroad, and any rounding errors 
the real stagnation during 1979-82, and the recent recovery. A few general 
observations are useful. First, on average, private consumption has grown 
more slowly then income, declining from 77 percent of GNP in 1966 to 61 
percent in 1985. The notable exception to this trend came during the 
1979-82 crisis. 
Second, government consumption has declined, both as a share of GNP 
and in terms of its contribution to growth. It is interesting that government 
consumption is often countercyclical. For example, the growth rate of 
government consumption dropped during the 1973 real growth spurt and 
increased sharply as GNP growth slowed during 1974. (Fiscal policy will be 
examined in more detail in ch. 11 .) 
Gross fixed investment has risen steadily as a share of GNP, from 18 
percent in 1966 to 30-33 percent during 1978-85. The dramatic increase in 
capital accumulation during the late 1970s was reversed during the 1979-82 
crisis. Since 1982 investment growth rates have returned to their early 1970s 
average. Stocks have been quite variable. On average, inventories accumu- 
lated from 1971-75 and have decumulated since 1976, with especially rapid 
declines during 1979-82. 
Table 7.4 also shows the well-documented rise in exports. From only 7.3 
percent of GNP in 1966, they had grown to 22.4 percent by 1973 and have 
remained at 38-39 percent since 1982. Imports also rose rapidly, from 16 
percent of GNP in 1966 to 43 percent by 1980, declining to 38 percent by 
1985. 
There are significant differences in the sources of GNP growth across the 
five time periods. During 1971-73, the rapid growth was attributable almost 
equally to private consumption and to exports, with fixed investment 
considerably less important. Net exports contributed almost 1 percentage 
point to growth, on average. Table 7.3 shows that manufacturing and 
services contributed 3.4 percent each, while agriculture contributed 1.1 
percent. 
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The slowdown in growth in the second period occurred as export growth 
dropped sharply. This was only partially offset by a decline in import growth 
and increases in private and government consumption. 
Exports and fixed investment were the two major sources of growth 
during the 1976-78 boom, contributing 6.8 and 6.9 percent, respectively. 
However, there was also a large jump in imports, so that the contribution of 
net exports to growth remained negative. On the industrial side, there was a 
rebound in both manufacturing and other services. 
The sources of stagnant real growth during the last crisis period differ 
considerably from the 1974-75 slowdown. As a result of very poor 
harvests, agriculture contributed - 3.6 percent to growth in 1980. However, 
this decline is offset by an unusually large contribution during 1981. (See 
table 7.3.) 
Unlike the earlier period in which the contribution of total investment 
actually rose (from 1.9 percent in 1971-73 to 2.5 percent in 1974-73, 
investment declined precipitously from 6.9 percent during 1976-78 to 0.4 
percent in 1979-82. Export growth also fell, but to 2.6 percent as compared 
to 1.9 percent during 1974-75. Furthermore, import growth slowed even 
more dramatically so that the contribution of net exports to GNP growth 
turned positive. There was also a very large decline in private consumption 
growth. 
Again, the sources of the 1983-85 rebound are quite different from the 
sources of earlier recoveries. In particular, growth rates for fixed investment, 
exports, and private consumption increase only moderately, with the 
contribution of private consumption to growth exceeding the contributions of 
the other two components. Government consumption does not play a role in 
the improved performance. A key factor is the surprisingly small increase in 
import growth-the contribution of net exports remains positive. 
We summarize our discussion by making four points. The first is that the 
well-documented role of exports as a source of growth is especially relevant 
in the early period. Second, investment has played a critical role, often 
rivaling exports in making the largest contribution to growth. Gross fixed 
investment contributes to capacity and is a critical determinant of future 
growth potential. The figures reported in table 7.4 strongly suggest an 
investment-led growth for Korea in which current investment stimulates 
future net exports, both through a rise in export production capacity and 
through a reduction in required manufactured imports. The high investment 
during the 1976-78 period helps to explain the reversal in the contribution 
of net exports to growth, from a negative one during 1974-78 to a positive 
one during 1979-85. Third, there has been a recent shift in the sources of 
growth. Moderate import expansion has permitted strong GNP performance 
despite the slowdown in growth rates of exports, investment, and private 
consumption. Finally, government consumption has played a small role 
throughout in explaining the performance. 
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7.3 The Role of Imports: Further Analysis 
The majority of imports are capital goods and raw materials. Final 
consumption goods constitute less than 5 percent of imports, Increases in 
investment and exports lead to direct increases in imports. This linkage 
implies that the figures in table 7.4 overestimate the contributions of these 
components to growth because they do not correct for the associated import 
growth. 
Korean input-output tables from the Bank of Korea provide “import 
requirement coefficients” by sector for selected years. Table 7.5 shows the 
actual coefficients for consumption, investment, and exports for four years: 
1970, 1975, 1980, and 1983. The numbers imply that a one-unit rise in 
consumption would have increased imports by 0.13 units in 1970 and by 
0.23 units in 1980. The import coefficients for investment jump from 0.39 in 
1970 to 0.48 in 1975, declining to 0.38 by 1983.’ The coefficients for 
exports jumped from 0.26 in 1970 to 0.36 in 1975, and have remained in 
that range through 1983. Using these data, the annual import coefficients for 
each sector can be approximated by interpolation. 
The next step is to decompose imports. There are seven components of 
demand ( Y ) :  private and government consumption, C and G; fixed invest- 
ment, IF; inventory investment, Inv; exports, X ;  imports, M; and nonfactor 
income, N F .  Imports are attributed to consumption, investment, exports, and 
a residual, E. The import coefficient for consumption, g ,  is assumed to be 
equally relevant for private and government consumption. The coefficient for 
investment, yc, is assumed to apply only to fixed investment, and not to 
changes in inventories. 
(1) Y = C + G +IF + I ~ v  + X  -M + NF 
( 2 )  M=y,(C+G)+yi IF+y,X+~ 
(3) Y =  (1  - yc)C + (1 - yc)G + (1 -?;)IF + I ~ v  + ( I  - y,)X- E + NF 
Table 7.6 uses the adjusted expenditure components to decompose the 
sources of GNP growth for the five subperiods. The same general trends 
emerge here as in table 7.4. However, the revised figures show that the 
simple decomposition overstates the contribution to Korean output coming 
Table 7.5 Import Requirement Coefficients for Korea (per unit final output) 
Year Consumption Investment Exports 
1970 0.13 0.39 0.26 
1975 0.18 0.48 0.36 
19x0 0.23 0.42 0.35 
1983 0.22 0.38 0.36 
Source: BOK, input-output tables 
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Table 7.6 Contributions to Growth by Expenditure (revised for import dependence) 
1971-73 1974-75 1976-78 1979-82 1983-85 
~ 
GNP 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Fixed investment 
Exports 
Imports (residudl) 
OtheP 
~ _ _ _ _ _ _  
9 46 7 65 
4 93 5 50 
0 51 I 2 9  
I 05 I31 
3 73 I21  
- 1 07 0 50 
0 30 -2 II 
~ 
11.74 
3.35 
0.70 
3.40 
3.82 
-0.46 
1.37 - 
3.57 8.58 
2.05 3.03 
0.29 0.33 
0.2 I 2.18 
1.19 2.26 
0.97 0.86 
1.15 -0.08 
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1987. 
"Includes inventories, net factor payments from abroad, and any rounding errors 
from growth of exports and fixed investment, particularly during the Big 
Push with its heavily import-dependent investments. 
7.4 Supply-side Sources of Korean Growth 
This section reviews the economic sources of Korean growth during 
1963-72 and 1972-82. The discussion is based on work by Kim and Park 
(1985), who have used the Denison growth accounting framework to analyze 
Korea.* The data in all of the tables reported below come from their study. 
Estimates of the sources of growth for the whole Korean economy are 
given in table 7.7. Beginning with the experience over the entire period, we 
point out three characteristics. First, as discussed above, Korea maintained 
very high rates of growth. Second, about two-thirds of its performance is 
attributable to increased factor inputs, with two-thirds of that increase arising 
from labor inputs and only one-third from additions to the capital stock. We 
shall see that the absolute and relative importance of factor inputs are 
distinguishing characteristics of Korea's experience. Finally, the most 
important contributions to Korean growth have been a result of increased 
employment, additions to nonresidential structures and equipment, and 
economies of scale. 
While these three characteristics provide a general picture of the sources 
of Korean growth, they do not capture the shifts in these sources over time 
or highlight those aspects which differentiate Korea's experience from that 
of other countries. After a brief discussion of the differences between the 
sources of growth during 1963-72 and 1972-82, we will compare Korean 
growth sources with those in other countries. 
As shown, the average growth rates of national income fell slightly from 
8.22 percent during 1963-72 to 7.05 percent during 1972-82. In the earlier 
period, approximately equal parts of the growth were attributable to 
increased factor inputs and to increased output per unit input.3 In the later 
period, however, actor inputs account for nearly 80 percent of the growth, 
with a corresponding decline in the contribution of productivity increases. 
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Table 7.7 Sources of Growth of the Korean Economy 
Source 
~ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _  
1963 - 72 1972-82 1963-82 
National income (growth rate) 
Total factor input 
Employment 
Average hours 
Age-sex composition 
Education 
Efficiency offset 
Unallocated 
Nonresidential structure and equipment 
Inventories 
International assets 
Dwellings 
Labor 
Capital 
Land 
Improved resource allocations 
Output per unit of input 
Contraction of agricultural inputs 
Contraction of nonagricultural 
self-employment 
Economies of scale 
Measured in U.S. prices 
Income elasticities 
Effect of weather on fanning 
Intensity of demand 
Advances in knowledge and n.e.c. 
Irregular factors 
8.22 (100.00) 
4.19 (51.00) 
3.05 (37.10) 
2.36 (28.70) 
0.32 (3.90) 
-0.01 (-0.10) 
0.31 (3.80) 
0.01 (0.10) 
0.06 (0.70) 
1.14 (13.90) 
1.09 (13.30) 
0.20 (2.40) 
-0.25 (-3.00) 
0.10 (1.20) 
0.00 (0.00) 
4.03 (49.00) 
0.63 (7.70) 
0.53 (6.40) 
0.10 (1.20) 
1.52 (18.50) 
0.87 (10.60) 
0.65 (7.90) 
-0.01 (-0.10) 
0.03 (0.40) 
-0.04 (-0.50) 
1.89 (23.00) 
7.05 (100.00) 
5.58 (79.10) 
3.48 (49.40) 
2.03 (28.80) 
0.45 (6.40) 
0.15 (2.10) 
0.44 (6.20) 
0.05 (0.70) 
0.36 (5.10) 
2.10 (29.80) 
2.59 (36.70) 
0.31 (4.40) 
-0.89 ( -  12.60) 
0.09 (1.30) 
0.00 (0.00) 
1.47 (20.90) 
0.68 (9.60) 
0.64 (9.10) 
0.03 (0.40) 
1.46 (20.70) 
0.85 (12.10) 
0.61 (8.70) 
-0.97 ( -  13.80) 
0.01 (0.10) 
-0.98 ( -  13.90) 
0.30 (4.30) 
7.61 (100.00) 
4.89 (64.30) 
3.31 (43.50) 
2.18 (28.60) 
0.40 (5.30) 
0.06 (0.80) 
0.39 (5.10) 
0.03 (0.40) 
0.25 (3.30) 
1.58 (20.80) 
1.80 (23.70) 
0.26 (3.40) 
-0.58 (-7.60) 
0.10 (1.30) 
0.00 (0.00) 
2.72 (35.70) 
0.67 (8.70) 
0.60 (7.90) 
0.06 (0.80) 
1.49 (19.60) 
0.86 (11.30) 
0.63 (8.30) 
-0.52 (-6.80) 
0.01 (0.10) 
-0.53 (-7.00) 
1.09 (14.30) 
Source: Kim and Park (1985) table 4.6 
Note; Growth rates and contributions to growth are in percentages. The share of total growth is given in 
parentheses. n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified. 
The contribution of factor inputs to growth rose in absolute as well as 
relative terms. In the first period, the total contribution was 4.19 percent as 
compared to 5.58 percent in the second period. From 1963 to 1972, labor 
accounts for 73 percent of the increase due to factor inputs, with 88 percent 
of the labor increase explained by greater employment and a rise in average 
work hours. From 1972 to 1982, the importance of labor declined somewhat 
to 62 percent of the total factor input, 71 percent of which is explained by 
increased employment and average hours. In both periods, equal contribu- 
tions to growth come from education and from increased work hours. 
The importance of capital nearly doubles from the first to the second 
period. This increase is due almost exclusively to additions of nonresidential 
structure and equipment, reflecting the rapid investment buildup which was 
initiated in the 1970s. The total contribution of capital would have been even 
larger if not for the high negative contribution from international assets- 
Korea’s net investment income from abroad has been negative since the 
mid- 1960s. 
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During 1972-82, the contribution of output per unit input fell to barely 
one-third of its level during the previous period. This development is not 
explained by either resource allocation or economies of scale, which retained 
approximately the same contribution to growth during both periods. The 
large decline came from two “irregular factors”-the impact of poor 
weather on farming and unfavorable developments in what Kim and Park 
(1985) label the intensity of demand. There was also some decline in the 
residual, as discussed further below. 
The above discussion highlights the importance of increased employment 
in explaining Korean growth. We find that it is also useful to examine the 
sources of growth per person employed. Table 7.8 shows that the average 
annual increase in labor productivity fell from 4.59 percent during 1963-72 
to 3.88 percent during 1972-82. Again, this aggregate figure masks a 
dramatic change between periods. In the earlier period, only 13 percent of 
growth per person employed is attributable to capital (human and/or 
physical), shifts in sectoral allocation of workers, or changes in land, while 
87 percent is attributable to increased productivity. After 1972, factor inputs 
account for 62 percent of growth per worker, with the increases in human 
and physical capital partially substituting for the substantial decline in 
productivity growth. 
Again, a large share of the reduction in productivity growth shows up in 
the residual. It is possible to suggest some explanations for this. Kim and 
Park (1985, 174-75) mention four alternatives. The first is changes in the 
efficiency of resource allocation arising from shifts in Korea’s industrializa- 
tion strategy: “the initial positive momentum from opening-up to semi-free 
trade was largely spent by the early seventies. . . . Korea again emphasized 
Table 7.8 
Source 1963-72 1972-82 I963 - 82 
Sources of Growth of the Korean Economy per Person Employed 
National income per 
person employed 
Irregular factors 
Factor inputs 
Labor 
Changes in hours 
Increased education 
More capital 
L e s s  land 
OutpuVinput 
L e s s  labor misallocation 
Economies of scale 
Advances in knowledge 
4.59 
-0.01 
0.56 
0.69 
0.38 
0.31 
0.32 
-0.45 
4.04 
0.63 
1.52 
1.89’ 
(100.00) 
(-0.20) 
( 12.20) 
(15.00) 
(8.30) 
(6.80) 
(7.00) 
( - 9.80) 
(88.00) 
( I  3.70) 
(33.10) 
(41.20) 
3.88 (100.00) 
2.41 (62.10) 
1.45 (37.40) 
1.01 (26.00) 
0.44 (11.30) 
1.42 (36.60) 
2.44 (62.90) 
0.68 (17.50) 
1.46 (37.60) 
0.30 (7.70) 
-0.97 (-25.00) 
-0.46 (-11.90 
4.23 
1.51 
1.13 
0.74 
0.39 
0.80 
-0.42 
3.22 
0.66 
1.48 
1.08 
-0.50 
(100.00) 
(-11.80) 
(35.70) 
(26.70) 
(17.50) 
(9.20) 
(18.90) 
(-9.90) 
(76.10) 
(15.60) 
(35.00) 
(25.50) 
Source: Kim and Park (1985, table 8.2). 
Note: Percentages in parentheses. 
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the import substitution of intermediate and capital goods during the 
seventies, in connection with the government promoted construction of 
heavy and chemical industries” (173). 
A second source of a decline in residual contributions to growth is 
increases in hours spent in required military and civil defense training. Since 
some of the implied absences from work are not counted in labor force 
statistics, the contribution of labor input to growth may have been 
overestimated, with the residual contribution underestimated (174). The third 
possibility arises from increased industrial concentration and, presumably, 
associated reductions in productive efficiency. The fourth possibility comes 
from the jump in oil prices after 1973. 
7.5 International Comparisons of the Sources of Growth 
Table 7.9 compares the sources of growth for Korea with the sources for 
Japan, the United States, Canada, and eight European countries over various 
time periods during 1950-73.4 As shown, Japan and Korea had the highest 
growth rates, followed by West Germany. In absolute terms, Korea and the 
faster growing European countries saw comparable gains from increased 
productivity. However, in terms of the composition of the sources of growth, 
Korea has less in common with the other rapid growth countries than with 
the slower growing United States and Canada, where increased factor inputs 
also accounted for two-thirds of growth. 
The rapid growth rates in Korea and Japan have frequently been 
compared. Although the aggregate growth levels are comparable, the sources 
are quite different. Korea had significantly higher growth of labor inputs 
(arising from increased employment and work hours) and fixed capital 
formation, but lower inventories5 and substantial outflows of international 
capital which decreased the overall contribution of capital. In terms of output 
per unit input, Japan recorded larger contributions to growth across the 
board, achieving larger gains from productivity increases than any of the 
other countries. Thus, the Korea-Japan comparison is somewhat misleading, 
because it fails to highlight the overwhelming importance of increased factor 
inputs in explaining the rapid Korean growth. 
In summary, the critical factor in Korea’s high and sustained growth has 
been the increasingly large contribution of factor inputs. Korea was able to 
maintain high growth rates in the 1970s, despite negative shocks and 
declines in the contribution of productivity, by raising the contributions from 
both labor and capital inputs. 
7.6 Current Account Improvement with Growth 
One of the striking aspects of Korea’s adjustment to the 1979-80 crisis 
was that a turnaround from negative to positive growth was combined with a 
Table 7.9 International Comparisons of Sources of Growth 
Percentage of Growth Percentage of Growth 
Growth Rate Factor Output per Resource Economies 
Country (standardized) Inputs Total Labor Capital Unit Input Total Allocations of Scale Other 
Korea 
Japan 
u s .  
Canada 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
West Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Noway 
U.K. 
8.13 
8.81 
3.79 
4.95 
3.03 
3.63 
4.70 
6.27 
5.60 
4.07 
3.43 
2.38 
4.89 0.60 0.41 0.19 
3.95 0.45 0.21 0.24 
2.13 0.56 0.37 0.19 
3.02 0.61 0.37 0.23 
1.17 0.39 0.25 0.14 
1.55 0.43 0.16 0.26 
1.24 0.26 0.10 0.17 
2.78 0.44 0.22 0.22 
1.66 0.30 0.17 0.13 
1.91 0.47 0.21 0.26 
1.04 0.30 0.04 0.26 
1.11 0.47 0.25 0.21 
3.24 0.40 0.08 
4.86 0.55 0.11 
1.66 0.44 0.08 
1.96 0.40 0.13 
1.86 0.61 0.17 
2.08 0.57 0.19 
3.46 0.74 0.20 
3.49 0.56 0.16 
3.94 0.70 0.25 
2.16 0.53 0.15 
2.39 0.70 0.27 
1.27 0.53 0.05 
0.18 0.13 
0.22 0.22 
0.08 0.28 
0.13 0.13 
0.17 0.17 
0.18 0.21 
0.21 0.32 
0.26 0.14 
0.22 0.23 
0.19 0.18 
0.17 0.26 
0.15 0.33 
Source: Kim and Park (1985, 67-69, table 4.7) 
Note: Data reported are for the period 1950-62 for all countries except the following: Korea, 1963-82; 
Japan, 1953-71; U.S.,  1948-73; and Canada, 1950-67. 
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substantial improvement in the current account. From a theoretical 
standpoint, there is nothing particularly surprising about this achievement. 
Strong export performance will stimulate output while reducing a trade 
deficit. However, an observer aware of only recent country experiences 
would be left with the impression that, at least in the short run of one to two 
years, countries improving their trade balance are most likely to do so by a 
domestic contraction which reduces imports.6 The natural question becomes 
why was Korea able to avoid the typical scenario and are there lessons to be 
learned for others that would like to follow suit. We focus here on the 
experience through 1985. The 1986 current account surplus, which raises a 
number of other issues, is discussed in detail by Dornbusch and Park (1987). 
Table 7.10 gives an overview of the Korean balance of payments. As 
shown, the current account worsened markedly from 2.1 percent of GNP in 
1978 to an average of 7.5 percent of GNP during 1979-81. The deterioration 
is accounted for primarily by a jump in imports and in payments for invisibles 
(primarily transport and investment income). 
Beginning in 1982, the current account deficit was steadily reduced, 
reaching 1 percent of GNP by 1985. In 1982 the improvement came in 
almost equal parts from the trade balance and from the balance on invisibles. 
There was essentially no growth in export receipts measured in U.S. dollars, 
so that the gains were due to a 3 percent decline in the value of imports. This 
decline is only partially explained by the 5 percent reduction in import 
prices. The unusual aspect is that imports rose by only 0.2 percent in 
physical terms even though real GNP grew by 5.4 percent. In 1983 the 
current account improvement was due primarily to strong export perfor- 
mance. In 1984 and 1985 the improvement continued, despite renewed 
deterioration of the invisibles account, because of a dramatic reduction in the 
trade deficit. Real output has grown strongly in each of these years, 
including the very rapid rates achieved during 1983 and 1984. 
Table 7.10 Current Account and GNP, 1977-86 (in billions of U.S. dollars 
and percentages) 
GNP 
Year Account (70) Balance Exports Imports Account Account (a) 
Current W G N P  Trade Invisibles Transfer Growth 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
0.012 
- 1.085 
-4.151 
-5.321 
-4.646 
-2.650 
- 1.606 
- 1.373 
-0.887 
4.617 
0.0 
-2.1 
-6.8 
-8.8 
-7.0 
-3.8 
-2.1 
-1.7 
- 1 . 1  
4.9 
-0,477 
- 1.781 
-4.396 
-4.384 
-3.628 
-2.594 
- 1.764 
- 1.036 
-0.019 
4.206 
10.046 
12.711 
14.704 
17.214 
20.671 
20.879 
23.204 
26.335 
26.442 
33.913 
10.523 
14.491 
19.100 
21.598 
24.299 
23.474 
24.967 
27.371 
26.460 
29.707 
0.266 
0.224 
-0.195 
- 1.386 
- 1.518 
-0.554 
-0.435 
-0.878 
- 1.446 
-0.628 
0.223 10.7 
0.472 11.0 
0.439 7.0 
0.449 -4.8 
0.501 6.6 
0.499 5.4 
0.592 11.9 
0.541 8.4 
0.578 5.4 
1.039 12.5 
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The real puzzle then is that imports did not rise more strongly with the 
recovery in growth. To examine import behavior more carefully, in table 
7.11 we decompose imports by major commodity group, while in table 7.12 
we show the annual growth rates for import values, import volumes, and 
unit import values for 1977-85. 
As expected, the tables show the large rise in import prices in 1979-81 
and the increase in imports of crude materials and mineral fuels. The Korean 
oil bill rose from 17.5 percent of total imports during 1976-78 to 27.3 
percent during 1980-82, as the value of petroleum imports increased by 
228.4 percent between the two periods. It is important to keep in mind that 
the OPEC revenue gains had favorable feedback effects for Korea. In 
particular, the value of overseas construction contracts to the Middle East 
were $14.2 billion larger during 1980-82 than during 1977-79, as 
compared with a $10.2 billion dollar rise in the value of imported petroleum 
and petroleum products between the same three-year periods.’ However, 
there were also very large increases in imported foods and machinery and 
transport equipment, especially during 198 1. 
Imports declined in 1982. There was a substantial reduction in world 
prices of Korean imports. Furthermore, import volumes grew very slowly. 
The major reason was the large decline in food imports as the agricultural 
sector registered a banner harvest. Although normal import growth resumed 
in 1983, import price developments continued to be extremely favorable. 
The question raised at the beginning of this section was how Korea 
managed to improve its trade balance while maintaining rapid real growth 
rates. Although export growth resumed by 1983, the initial improvements 
depended on the behavior of imports. The analysis above points to four 
factors. The first is the favorable price developments during 1982-85. The 
second is the role of weather conditions in creating an unusual sectoral 
composition of growth post-1979. A bad harvest leads to increased food 
imports. When domestic agriculture recovers, output and the trade balance 
are improved simultaneously. The fourth factor involves policy more 
directly. Korea has restricted consumer imports and thereby limits those 
imports which tend to have the highest income elasticities. Most imports in 
Korea are tied to industrial requirements for imported materials. 
Are there lessons to be learned from this episode, in terms of policy 
advice to other countries? It is very difficult to argue that policy choices were 
a determining factor in Korea’s ability to use growth to improve the current 
account. Other countries which followed the same policies, but had different 
shocks (e.g., external prices and harvests) should not expect the same 
outcome. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that Korea, faced with a 
large trade deficit in the future, will be able to repeat this performance, 
unless the deficit is again linked to a temporary decline in agriculture and to 
a temporary deterioration in the terms of trade. 
Table 7.11 Imports by Major Commodity Group, 1976-84 
Food, Crude Mineral Machinery 
Year Etc. Materials Fuels Petroleum Chemicals Manufactures & Transportation Ships Other Total 
Panel A (in rnillir 
1976 720 
1977 834 
1978 1,087 
1979 1,655 
1980 1,993 
1981 2,926 
1982 1,708 
1983 1,886 
1984 1,864 
ms of U S .  dollars) 
1,565 1,747 1,658 866 
1,941 2,179 2,065 1,005 
2,395 2,453 2,312 1,298 
3,260 3,779 3,416 2,009 
3,634 6,638 6.164 1,836 
3,630 7,765 6,918 2,109 
3,370 7,593 6,740 2,084 
3,480 6,958 6,195 2,281 
3,951 7,274 6,414 2,762 
1,479 
1,929 
2,782 
3,440 
3,122 
3.562 
3,394 
3,942 
4,881 
2,387 
2,908 
4,947 
6,125 
4,977 
6.000 
6.009 
7,556 
9.797 
397 10 
193 13 
402 I I 
316 71 
472 93 
873 141 
1,119 93 
1,798 93 
2,704 102 
8,774 
10,811 
14.972 
20,339 
22,292 
26.131 
24,251 
26,192 
30,631 
Panel B (in percentage of total imports) 
1976 0.08 0.18 0.20 
1977 0.08 0.18 0.20 
1978 0.07 0.16 0. I6 
1979 0.08 0.16 0.19 
1980 0.09 0.16 0.30 
1981 0.11 0.14 0.30 
1982 0.07 0.14 0.31 
1983 0.07 0.13 0.27 
1984 0.06 0.13 0.24 
0.19 
0.19 
0.15 
0.17 
0.28 
0.26 
0.28 
0.24 
0.21 
0.10 
0.09 
0.09 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
0.09 
0. I7 
0.18 
0.19 
0.17 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.27 
0.27 
0.33 
0.30 
0.22 
0.23 
0.25 
0.29 
0.32 
0.05 0.00 1.00 
0.02 0.00 1.00 
0.03 0.00 1.00 
0.02 0.00 1.00 
0.02 0.00 1.00 
0.03 0.01 1.00 
0.05 0.00 1.00 
0.07 0.00 1.00 
0.09 0.00 1.00 
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Table 7.12 Percentage Changes in Components of Import Growth, 1977-85 
Year Import Value Import Volume Unit Value Real GNP 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
I982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
23.2 
38.5 
35.8 
9.6 
17.2 
8.0 
16.9 
1.6 
-7.2 
20.5 
31.2 
11.1 
-8.9 
11.2 
2.2 
13.3 
15.4 
6.2 
2.2 
5.6 
22.2 
20.3 
5.4 
-7.4 
-4.7 
1.3 
-4.2 
10.7 
11.0 
7.0 
-4.8 
6.6 
5.4 
11.9 
8.5 
5.4 
8 Savings and Investment 
During each of Korea’s periods of rapid debt accumulation, virtually all of 
the additional foreign borrowing was used to finance current account deficits. 
Since domestic investment must be financed through some combination of 
domestic and foreign savings, foreign savings-r the deficit in the current 
account-is exactly equal to the imbalance between domestic savings and 
investment. 
In this chapter we examine the behavior of the current account from the 
savings-investment perspective. The decomposition is especially interesting 
for Korea because its experience differs markedly from that of many other 
debtor countries. A frequently observed pattern is for the current account 
deficit to increase as government savings decline and then for a current 
account improvement to be attained, at least in the short run, through cuts in 
(public and private) investment and in government expenditure, thus raising 
government savings. Relatively little of the adjustment tends to be achieved 
through private sector savings. 
Korean experience contrasts with the “stylized” scenario with respect to 
the roles of investment, public savings, and private savings. First, fiscal 
deficits have played at most a minor role in current account deterioration. 
Instead, increases in fixed investment, associated with new economic 
development strategies, have outpaced rising private savings. This leaves the 
door open for a jump in required foreign financing to cover either unexpected 
surges in inventory accumulation or unexpected drops in private savings. 
The series of five-year economic and social plans have played a critical role 
through their impact on investment. Second, the reduction of the current 
account deficit during the recovery is achieved without a substantial decline 
